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Cases on Contracts. By Arthur L. Corbin. St. Paul, West Publishing Co.,
I92L pp. xxiv, 1514.
This volume of cases is one of the American Casebook Series published now
under the general editorship of Professor Vance of Yale.
The thing that first attracts one's attention in examining the collection is the
great quantity of new material. Professor Corbin tells us that nearly half the
cases have been decided since i9oo. This is indicative of its general attitude. It
is decidedly up to date. The preface states that the purpose of the editor is to
furnish material for answering the question, What are our American courts
going to decide to-morrow? He has accomplished that purpose. There is
so much new American material in the book that probably many teachers would
deem it wise to omit perhaps a fourth of the cases so as to have time for ade-
quate discussion of those taken. But the quantity of material is an advantage
rather than a defect in the compilation. Every instructor can thus, to a con-
siderable extent, make his own case-book
The topics treated are the same as those in Professor Williston's well-known
case-book on the same subject. Such topics as dapacity of parties, construction
of language, fraud, duress, rescission in equity, damages, and specific performance
are omitted. This is justified by the presence of those subjects in other courses
commonly taught in our law schools. There is a tendency here and there to
include matter showing the relief possible in equity, as witness the cases on pp.
121 and 124. It is rather surprising, therefore, to find in the chapter on Assign-
ment none of the early equity cases which portray the history of assignment and
explain its modern limitations. Though one of the equity cases is given at page
1127 1t is for a different purpose. The writer has always thought that a group
of selected cases on beneficiaries might well include one good equity case like
Keller v. Ashford (i89o) 133 U. S. 6Io, to acquaint the student with the doctrine of
subrogation as applied in such cases. The solution of payment beneficiary cases
by applying equitable subrogation should have been more successful in its com-
petition with Lawrence v. Fox than it has been. No such case appears in Pro-
fessor Corbin's chapter. In Fry v. Ausinan, p. io8o, an excerpt from Keller v.
Ashford is quoted by the court. But the Fry case, while excellent on its own
point, neither follows the doctrine of subrogation nor brings it adequately before
the student.
The order of topics in the present volume is unusual and the writer must con-
fess that his experience would not have led him to adopt it. One may, with
Professor Williston, adopt a logical or perhaps chronological order: formation,
parties affected, performance and discharge. This brings the topic of considera-
tion close to the beginning of the course. The law of consideration is technical,
rather unreasonable in spots and not easily assimilated by beginning students.
If possible it should be postponed somewhat. By the same order illegality, which
is relatively easy, comes near the end of the course. Now Professor Corbin in
his preface states that "the order of arrangement has been chosen with the pur-
pose of making the topics and the individual cases most readily understood by the
beginning student." *Tested by this aim it would seem that illegality might be
placed near the beginning and consideration postponed. Instead, consideration
is found in the second chapter and illegality in next to the last and after discharge
of contracts. Still more puzzling is the advancing of the difficult subject of con-
ditional contracts to the first half of the volume. But, as Professor Corbin says,
each teacher can readily choose his own order of topics. There is no attempt to
follow the order of Anson on Contract which the author has recently edited.
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There is a more minute subdivision of chapters than is found in Williston's
Cases on Contracts. This seems to the writer an improvement. Students other
than the very best tend to get lost in the course before the end is reached. This
is especially true in Implied Conditions. Mr. Corbin has a quite detailed subdivi-
sion here. It chiefly turns, however, on the subject matter of the contracts or
condition involved, as "Contracts of Service," "Certificate of Architect or Engi-
neer," "Condition of Notice." Some, and the writer is among them, may think
that an analytical classification would be more useful to the student. The follow-
ing is offered as an illustration of what is meant:
i. Express Conditions.
(a) Distinguished from Promises.
(b) Distinguished from Implied Conditions.
(c) Their Construction.
(d) Their Performance.
(e) Express Conditions e~cceptionally Treated:
(I) Architect's Certificate.
(2) Condition for Personal Satisfaction.
(3) Conditions in Leases.
2. Implied Conditions.
(a) History.
(b) Effect of Serjeant Williams' Rules.
(c) General Principles.




(d) Condition Requiring Notice.
(e) Substantial Performance.







5. Excuses for Non-performance.
(a) Generally.
(b) Prevention.




Anticipatory Breach may well be placed in a separate chapter. Impossibility
as an excuse for non-performance of conditions probably can be treated best at
the end of the chapter on impossibility as a discharge of a promise. The ques-
tion whether the various excuses for breach of a condition are also excuses for
breach of a promise might also be considered in section five above, though
analytically it is a distinct problem.
As to the cases chosen a word or two must be said. About three fourths of
them are cases not found in other case books. They are modern American cases
containing good discussion of the problems in hand and illustrating the variety
of American opinion. They have crowded out many of the old familiar friends.
But in general the really important older cases have been retained. One finds
Williams v. Carwardine, Adams v. Lindsell, Dickinson v. Dodds, Rann v. Hughes,
Foakes v. Beer, Pordage v. Cole, Kingstoni v. Preston, Norrington v. Wright,
Hochster vt. De la Tour, Daniels v. Newton, Taylor v. Caldwell, Ford v. Beech,
Tweddle v. Atkinson, Lawrence v. Fox, Winch v. Keeley, Nordenfelt v. Maxim
Company, Eastwood v. Kenyon and many others. Useful cases like Los Angeles
Traction Company v. Wilshire, p. i8g, De Cicco v. Schweizer, p. 376, Seaver v.
Ransom, p. io6i, and others have been rightly added. But why was Slade's Case
relegated to a footnote on page 389? Indeed why was the history of assumpsit,
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which is substantially the early history of contract law, excluded? The cases
printed on the early history of consideration illustrate chiefly the vacillations of
the early courts between benefit and detriment on the one hand and between real
detriment and technical detriment on the other. Also one looks for Dunlop and
Company v. Selfridge and Company, the English case settling that a promisee
who did not furnish the consideration cannot sue on the contract, and finds it
excluded on page IO4O for an early English case to the contrary. None of the
late English cases, such as Millar and Company v. Taylor and Company,
[i916, C. A.] I K. B. 402, discussing the effect of partial impossibility caused by
war, are included. Even the coronation cases are merely mentioned on p. gio in
a note.
The footnotes are copious and helpful. The collections of authorities show
an immense amount of well spent effort. They are a great addition to the vol-
ume. It seems captious to be critical of them. It is, however, true that they are
used occasionally to present the author's views or reasoning rather than as
mirrors of the authorities. This may be seen on pp. 72, 76, 85, 235, 267 and
elsewhere. This is leading the student and sometimes it will happen that he is
led in a direction which the instructor will think erroneous.
In the preface Professor Corbin pays a tribute to the analytical work of Pro-
fessor Wesley N. Hohfeld. As he says, Hohfeld's conceptions and reasoning do
not find a place in a case-book but rather in class discussion. On page 197, how-
ever, and occasionally elsewhere, there are notes applying Hohfeld's distinctions
to the matter in hand. The note on that page seems to the writer too subtle for
the useful consideration of beginning students.
On the whole the book shows scholarship and thoroughness. The teacher who
cannot by its use give to a class a sound knowledge of the generalprinciples of
contract law should be in some other field of endeavor.
CLARiE B. WHITTIER.
Stanford University Law School.
The Equality of States in International Law. By Edwin DeWitt Dickinson.
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920. pp. xiii, 424. $4.00.
Professor Dickinson has given us an admirable presentation of the history of
the idea of the equality of states. He has traced opinions from the earliest times
down to the present day with a clear presentation of the views held at different
periods and with careful references to the sources.
He has discussed the equality of states in a sense of equality in capacity for
rights.
Of course one goes back to the early discussions relating to the law of nature and
the odd theory of the state of nature in which human society may have been
supposed to exist at some periods. Of course such a state of nature in fact never
was, but it afforded a convenient hypothesis on which philosophical discussion
might be based. There was a natural transition from the rights of persons to the
rights of a state whatever might be the source of each.
Grotius, Dr. Dickinson points out, on the whole did not base his doctrines on
supposed natural rights, but he held rather to the practice of existing states as to
equality before the law.
The text writers who follow Grotius fall into three classes with -regard to the
source of law; the Naturalists, the Positivists, and the Eclectics. Hobbes, Pufen-
dorf, Vattel, and others illustrate these various schools, and Dr. Dickinson has
caught their essence very successfully.
The chapter on the documentary sources of the igth century and the two chapters
on the internal and the external limitations of equality are especially luminous.
The various Congresses and Conferences are also discussed and their policies as
to equality'of their constituent members are made clear.
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Of course any general international conference like those of the Hague raises at
once the question of the relative weight of the member states. By far the greatest
amount of international interests of the world belong to the great nations. On
the other hand each small nation is just as strenuous for its independence and for
its equality in the conferences with every other nation. That is the case with the
great states themselves. How these conflicting views can be reconciled with refer-
ence to international co-operation is a matter not at all easy to settle. Perhaps some
statesman wise enough to settle it may be discovered some day. Until that day
we cannot expect great progress in the serious and permanent establishment of
international bodies. Equality, social and political, is not entirely unknown as a
puzzling question in the development of states. It is perhaps still more puzzling in
international relations.
But "equal" and "equality" are words with no substantive meaning. In fact
they are mere algebraic symbols, and have no force at all excepting as asserting a
specific relationship of what precedes to what follows, e. g., "the three angles of
a triangle are together equal to two right angles." To understand what it is that
is equal to something else we must know exactly what is meant by both terms.
"All men are born equal," recites the Declaration of Independence-in other
words, every human being is at birth equal to any other human beirig. Equal in
what? Obviously not physically, nor in mental or moral capacity, nor in oppor-
tunity. Equal, the Declaration goes on to say, in certain fundamental rights--"life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Wisely, the fathers did not attempt an
enumeration of all fundamental rights. Equal, perhaps, in the capacity to acquire
other rights which are essential to those which are fundamental-the right to
acquire and to possess property, the right to freedom of locomotion, the right.to
form contracts, the right to protection to a certain extent by organized society.
The right to vote and to hold office? Not necessarily. These are political rights,
and are granted by the state to some, but not all, of its members. When the Con-
stitution was adopted, political rights were possessed by no negroes, by no women,
by no minors, and by no means by all adult men. It was the theory of the Con-
stitution that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were natural rights which
belonged to all human beings, at least to all white men, while political rights were
artificial-were solely the creation of law.
Essentially the same principles may be held to apply to states. The right to exist,
to independence, to follow its own ideas of well-being, may be held to belong natu-
rally to every state. Such rights as the common consent of nations has held to be
embodied in international law, may be held to belong to all states. Such obliga-
tions as under international law are incumbent on states are doubtless obligatory
on all states alike. Such specific rights and obligations as may be acquired by any
state under certain conditions-by such states, for instance, as have a sea-coast and
sea-borle trade-may be acquired equally by any state. All these are common
rights and obligations which are recognized as belonging to all. In this sense all
states are equal-equal, that is, in the rights and obligations which belong to them
or which they have a capacity to acquire.
In municipal law we say that all members of a state are equally entitled to the
protection of the law. There is a government to which all are subject, and on
which each citizen has an equal claim with any other citizen. But in the relation
of nations one with another this is true only in part. There is' no general super-
national government. International law is enforced either by such moral forces
as the conscience and self-respect of the strong, or the public opinion of the world
at large, or by such physical force as may be applied by an individual state either
alone or with the aid of others. To the moral forces all states are equally entitled.
But physical force may fail the weak, and as the world is now organized there
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is no general legal obligation of other states to come to its aid. In other words
all states are not equal in the protection of their rights.
Any member of a municipal state may, by misconduct, forfeit any of his rights,
no matter how fundamental, how natural, how "inalienable" they may be. In like
manner a state may so conduct itself that its neighbors are no longer bound to
heed its independence. The existence of rights implies a society of nations.
Equality in the possession of rights implies the corresponding scrupulous heeding
of obligations. If a state forfeits its rights it thereby forfeits its equality in the
family of international states.
But if a number of states unite in a conference or an association of any form,
are they equal by right, for instance, in their weight of decision? Is each state
entitled to the same vote as any other state?
That is wholly a political question. No state has a natural right to membership
in any international association, or to any specific proportion of weight in such
association. Its membership and its relative voting strength are matters of agree-
ment-of contract-and nothing else. In short, the political rights of states are
wholly contractual, and have no existence at all antecedent to the contract.
That states are unequal in population, in wealth, in degree of civilization, is
obvious. That all are extremely jealous of their independence, is equally obvious.
That large and powerful states will be likely to enter an association of nations
under such conditions as may impair their independence by submitting to a majority
vote of small states, under the doctrine of unlimited political equality, is unthink-
able. "The Federation of the World" cannot be formed on that basis. Inter-
national agreements on that basis for limited purposes may be formed. Agree-
ments among a limited group of states for more general purposes may be formed.
But the principle that all states are equal for all international purposes is a
chimaera.
HARRY PArr JuDsoT.
The University of Chicago.
Training for the Public Profession of the Law. By Alfred Zantzinger Reed.
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Bulletin Number
Fifteen. New York, i921. pp. xviii, 498.
Those who have been heard to declare that this heavy volume is without any
value are much mistaken. Its historical and statistical portions, manifestly the
product of prodigious industry, afford a wealth of significant material which later
writers with some understanding of the actual problems of legal education should
be able to use with great advantage. Teachers of law, members of examination
boards, and others peculiarly interested in the progress of legal education, are
under a debt of gratitude to the Carnegie Foundation for the considerable
expense of money and effort involved in assembling and publishing this great
mass of apparently accurate information. This debt is none the less because the
most patient reader finds little value or interest in those portions of the work in
which the author essays to interpret the facts gathered with such commendable
industry, in order to assess the present status of legal education, and, to quote
the words of the preface written by the President of the Foundation, "to point
out certain broad lines along which legal education and methods of admission to
the bar must develop if the profession of the law is to fulfil its true function."
Dominating the author's interpretative efforts are three quite remarkable dis-
coveries which may thus be described in the apparent order of their importance.
First is the great fundamental principle of our democratic political philosophy
which has "battered down the gates of privilege" so that the great mass of aver-
age citizens, "Lincoln's plain people," might not be barred from participation in
the important governmental function discharged by the legal profession. Second
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is the "unitary bar," which is a very bad thing, not because it exists, for it seems
it doesn't, but because of the fact that bar examiners, law teachers and other
foolish persons persist in acting as if it did. The last great discovery is "the
law as it is," which, it seems, is quite different from the "national law" devised
by the law teachers. This "national law" appears to be a system of law as it
ought to be everywhere and is not anywhere.
These concepts the author takes very seriously. Applying them in bewilder-
ing permutation to the different problems that he discovers, he obtains quite
surprising results. Thus in one place he glorifies the night or "part time" school,
as the beneficent agent of democracy providing for Lincoln's plain people,
whether qualified or not, an easy .way of approach to the bar. He severely rebukes
those who differ from him, thinking that democracy requires not that the bar, but
only the opportunity to qualify for the bar, should be wide open, and hence
regard the night schools, with their prevailingly low standards of admission and
graduation, as possibly a detriment to the public rather than a benefit. The
author thinks that "when this attitude does not reflect merely a failure to grasp
the necessary implications of a democratic form of' government, it is itself an
indication how badly these schools are needed." Yet in other places he seems to
deplore the low standards of admission to the bar, says that the bar is flooded
with incompetents, and finally says that "it is not too much to say that up to the
present time they (the night schools) have done more harm than good." What
does he mean? Is it that the night schools should raise their requirements to
meet, say, those set by the resolution passed at the last meeting of the American
Bar Association, or that the flood gates shall remain open as at present? In the
former case he knows that the night schools would cease to be profitable, and
would, with few exceptions, pass out of existence. If he favors letting Lincoln's
plain people come to the bar unqualified, why, should he use hard words about
them afterwards?
But while the great principle of democracy that batters down the gates of
privilege and lets in Lincoln's plain people is important, even fundamental, it is
the "unitary bar" that portends disaster to the legal profession. It seems that
a unitary bar, if you could find it, would be one with a unified function. As a
matter of fact, however, this unitary bar is a sort of ghostly thing that exists
only in the minds of those who don't know that it is already "differentiated in
function." It is not the English differentiation into barristers and solicitors.
That has long since been thi-own over by a triumphant democracy. It seems
that there are "distinct types," to wit, two types, but just what it is that distin-
guishes these types the author does not make clear. For a time the reader is led
to believe that this differentiation is chargeable, in part at least, to the different
methods of the law schools; the graduates of the case method schools, being pro-
foundly versed, even "inhumanly expert" in "national law," are of the superior
type, while the graduates of the text book schools who have only a practical
knowledge of "law as it is," supply the inferior type. But just here we learn
that the lawyer of inferior type, being practically trained, will make more
money than his theoretical superior brothers, and being closer to the people, will
make good in politics, attain to high public office and there be able to hire the
superior lawyers to do his drafting or anything else he has a mind to. But this
line of easy inference is rudely broken when we read of the unexpectedly
dreadful consequences that have resulted from a failure of the law schools to
recognize this functional differentiation of the bar, and their stupid endeavors
to teach all kinds of lawyers all kinds of law. Let teachers of law read these
words and tremble: "Attempts by each type of law school to carry the entire
burden of legal education produce such unsuccessful results as to bring the
entire body of practitioners into disrepute." We are further told that the law
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teachers must forthwith reform in this respect "if judges, lawyers and poli-
ticians are to regain that place in popular esteem which is essential to a law
abiding community." One would scarcely have guessed that a vicarious reform
of this simple sort would be sufficient to re-establish the politicians! After.
learning these very disquieting things, one would at once set about effecting a
"functional division" of this dangerous unitary bar, which is already so thoroughly
"differentiated functionally" that it can't possibly be integrated again, just like
Humpty Dumpty that fell off the wall. But alas! it seems that the basis
of this indispensable division of the unitary bar is not at all certain, or even
ascertainable. Anyhow it will be slow, and "may not be completed by those now
living." Worse than that, "we may or may not be able eventually to intro-
duce . . . . the functionally divided bar." And even if we could, possibly it
would not do any good after all, for is it not written, "If one-tenth of the
thought that has been given to this vain effort [to unify legal education] had been
expended upon the problem of dividing the bar along lines that can be justified
on both political and educational grounds, by this time we might or might not
have attained a solution entirely satisfactory." It is to be. feared that the
author's "broad lines" of development are quite too broad to be serviceable.
W. R. VANCE.
Yale University School of Law.
Internationtal Law and the World War. By James Wilford Garner. In Two
Volumes. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. Vol. I, pp. xviii,.I-524;
Vol. II, pp. xii, 1-534. $24.
Professor Garner's two large volumes on International Law and the World War,
replete with historic information and most highly documented, would require, for
any adequate review, many more pages than can be here devoted thereto. I omit
from examination the very full and interesting discussion of the German war
philosophy and the German war measures. Professor Garner's reasoned con-
clusion, after full examination of Germany's apologies and explanations, differs
in no wise from the verdict of America registered by its entry into the war and
consecrated by the soldier lads who gave their lives to the great allied cause. It
may be enough on this point to cite the language of the official German war manual
that:
"War is not merely a conflict between armed forces, but that it is legitimate for a
belligerent to destroy the spiritual (geistig) as well as the material power of the
enemy."
This portion of Professor Garner's work compasses the larger part of the vol-
umes, and I shall confine myself to matters of a more technical, and, from a legal
standpoint, difficult and interesting character.
To the lawyer the most interesting part of this work is the discussion involving
the exercise of sea power by Great Britain, especially with respect to the 
legal
doctrines of contraband and blockade. Early in the war some of these questions
arose in connection with American ships, and a diplomatic correspondence 
between
the Foreign Office and the State Department ensued which continued until the
entrance of the United States into the war. These questions still remain open, 
and,
if it ever becomes necessary to submit them to an international tribunal, will give
rise to discussions of the greatest technical interest to lawyers and 
diplomats.
It seems more probable, however, that in view of the joining of the United States
with France and Great Britain in the War and its adoption of the very methods
complained of, these controversies will not reach an international tribunal, and will
either be allowed to drop entirely, or, if damage claims require adjustment, 
be
made the subject of diplomatic negotiations.
The most serious controversy arose over the British Orders in Council establish-
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ing what was in effect a blockade. By reason of Germany's geographical situation,
Dutch and Scandinavian ports, while neutral, were also natural ports for Germany,
and, in order that the British blockade might have effect, it was necessary to stop
goods going to those ports which might ultimately find their way to Germany.
This the British Government undertook to do by the application of the doctrine of
"continuous voyage" or "ultimate destination," and, in order to find precedent,
certain cases in the Supreme Court of the United States consequent upon the Civil
War were adduced, and much rather subtle discussion took place between the two
governments regarding some of these cases, especially that of The Springbok (1866,
U. S.) 5 Wall. i, The Bermuda (1865, U S.) 3 Wall. 514, The Hart (1865, U. S.)
3 Wall. 559, The Peterhoff (1866, U. S.) 5 Wall. 28, and others.
Professor Garner states the difficulties confronting the British Government and
the necessity for the liberal application or extension of the old rules as follows:
"The old English rule, according to which the destination of the ship was
primarily the test, was effective enough under the conditions of land transit then
existing, but with the development of railway and other facilities for land transpor-
tation, which made it as easy for a belligerent to obtain over-sea supplies by land
through the medium of adjacent neutral ports as through his own ports, the old
rule no longer sufficed. Unless, therefore, a belligerent were allowed to apply
the doctrine of ultimate destination to the carriage of contraband to such neutral
ports, his power to intercept contraband would be of little avail in a war with a
continental enemy. Accordingly, the prize courts of France, the United States, and
Italy extended the old rule so as to make it conform to the altered conditions."
The extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade running was
severely criticised in the American notes.
"They pointed out that in the case of The Peterhoff the United States Supreme
Court definitely refused to extend the rule of continuous voyage to blockade
running, by declining to condemn goods shipped from England to Matamoras, a
non-blockaded port, although the evidence indicated that the goods were to be
transported by land from Matamoras to the Confederacy. In short, the doctrine
of continuous voyage did not apply when the last lap of the voyage was by inland
transportation from a neutral port to enemy territory, although it did apply when
the second part of the voyage was by sea. The voyage of the Peterhoff, it was
said, was exactly parallel to a voyage during the recent war from New York to
Rotterdam or Copenhagen, whereas those with which the Supreme Court was
dealing in The Springbok and other similar cases were not."
Professor Garner in reviewing the controversy seems to us to indicate the com-
mon-sense view in holding that:
"Although the action of the British government was severely criticised in
neutral countries, there is good ground for arguing that the extension of the rule
of continuous voyage to blockade running is a logical consequence of the admitted
right of a belligerent to cut off the overseas commerce of the enemy. To hold
that the doctrine of continuous voyage may be applied when both laps of the
voyage are by sea, but not when the second is by land, is to introduce distinctions
which seem to be neither logical nor reasonable under modern conditions. It
would seem that the better test is not whether the voyage is continuous by sea,
but whether the real destination of the goods is enemy territory. The distinction
between the two situations tends to render the right of blockade illusory in many
cases and makes the means of transportation rather than the intent or effect the
real test."
That it will be possible for the nations to reach a definite agreement in regard
to limitations upon the application of the doctrines of contraband and blockade
seems for the present at least improbable. In any world conflict sea-power will
necessarily be exercised to starve out the enemy, and, unless the neutrals are
stronger than the belligerents, and resolute to maintain the letter of the law, they
must necessarily suffer loss and inconvenience. In fact, it seems difficult to believe
that any adequate rules can be formulated which will be strictly adhered to in a
world war and in an age when modem mechanical progress has so modified old
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methods and given birth to such new conditions. As long as the belligerent may
indefinitely enlarge his list of contraband, the neutral has little protection.
Professor John B. Moore thinks the proper solution is to found
"if'not in the abolition of the principle of contraband, at any rate (i) in the
adoption of a plan embracing the abolition of conditional contraband, and (2)
a single list having been agreed upon, in the co~peration of neutrals and belliger-
ents in the certification of the contents of cargoes so that the risk of capture may
be borne by those who may voluntarily assume it. .... Harassing searches and
detentions will then be heard of no more."
The sale of munitions to belligerents is fully treated, and the position assumed
by 'the United States in refusing to interfere with munition exports shown to be
entirely justified both by principle and precedent.
The vexed questions of interference with the mails, and of the so-called Black
List are also fully discussed. These practices were carried far by Great Britain
and somewhat extended by the United States after its entrance into the war.
The interesting case of The Appam, the German prize, which in February, 1916,
took refuge in Newport News claiming the right to remain there indefinitely under
Article i9 of the Prussian-American Treaty of 1799, is set out by our author in
detail, and the disposition of this interesting case by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co. (1917) 243
U. S. 124, 37 Sup. Ct. 337, approved.
"The decision was entirely in accord with the letter and spirit of the Hague
convention, as well as the policy of modern nations, especially the United States
and Great Britain. It is clear that the Hague conference intended to prohibit
the taking of prizes into neutral ports except in cases of unseaworthiness, stress
of weather, or lack of fuel or provisions, and that when taken in for any of these
reasons they were bound to leave as soon as the necessity for their entrance had
passed. No such necessity caused the Appam to enter a port of the United
States; its entrance therefore was a violation of the neutrality of the country and
the captor could not hold it there until the end of the war. It remained the
property of the original owners."
This case is by far the most important as yet decided by our courts as a resultant
of the Great War and gave rise to much discussion among lawyers and publicists.
Professor Garner concludes that in the future, if there is to be greater observance
of the rules of international law, a new attitude must be adopted, and breaches of
international law, heretofore regarded as analogous to tort, should now be
regarded as crimes concerning all civilized states.
The two volumes are written in interesting fashion and contain matter of the
utmost value. Professor Garner is to be congratulated upon having sifted through
a great mass of material and given a sequent, detailed, and interesting account of
the various legal controversies arising during the war. This book will be valuable
not only to lawyers and publicists, but to the many thousands who are hopeful that,
out of the hideous travail of the world conflict, there may arise a better civilization
founded upon respect for public law, and ready to substitute judicial procedure for
the arbitrament of force. The goal is probably far distant but cannot be deemed
impossible of attainment, and intelligent study of the past is not without
encouragement for the future.
FREDmuc R. COUDERT.
New York, N. Y.
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